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Introduction
The most remarkable aspect of the three-page agreement that ended the
twenty month war between Russia and Chechnya is that it effectively ended
all combat and bloodshed while solving none of the political problems that
caused the war. The vague agreement signed by Russian General Alek-
sandr Lebed in August 1996 and the follow-up agreement signed by Rus-
sian President Boris Yeltsin and Chechyn President Aslan Maskhadov in
May 1997 established a moratorium on the question of Chechnya's status
until 2001.1 While Lebed's sentiment was that the five-year postponement
of the issue was critical to allow the two sides to "calmly and
soberly ... sort out [their] relations,"2 the Chechens consider the Russian
withdrawal to be a victory, and recently celebrated their seventh anniver-
sary of self-proclaimed independence. 3 In effect, the two sides have not
deviated from their positions as articulated before the war. The Chechens
will settle for nothing less than full, unconditional independence, and are
demanding a "large-scale political agreement envisaging the establishment
of diplomatic relations [between Russia and Chechnya]." 4 In contrast, the
Russian objective is to retain territorial integrity,5 and President Yeltsin has
"ruled out any agreement with Chechnya that would recognize the separa-
tist republic as an independent country."'6 As a result, a "diplomatic war" 7
between Russia and Chechnya has ensued in the three years since the sign-
ing of the first agreement at Khasavyurt.8
The talks between the two sides are ongoing. Over half of the five-year
truce has expired, yet nothing has been resolved. While Russia has
expressed a willingness to allow Chechnya greater autonomy as part of a
long-term settlement by which Chechnya would remain a constituent
republic of the Russian Federation, Chechen President Maskhadov is
unwilling to assent to anything less than a comprehensive settlement pro-
1. See Yuri Golotyuk, Chernomyrdin and Yandarbiyev Manage to Reach Agreement,
RusstAN PREss DIG., Oct. 4, 1996, at 1.
2. David Hoffman, Chechen, Lebed Sign Peace Deal; Decision on Sovereignty For Rus-
sian Region Deferred for Five Years, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 1997, at Al.
3. See In Brief. Chechnya Celebrates, Moscow TIMES, Sept. 8, 1998, at Al, available
in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, MOSTMS File.
4. Russia and Chechnya: One Year Without War, RussIuN PRESS DIG., Sept. 2, 1997, at
1.
5. See Alan Kasayev, New Khasavyurt Accords on Horizon, RussIAN PRESS DIG., Aug.
8, 1997, at 1.
6. Yeltsin Rules Out Chechnya Treaty, WASH. PosT, Sept. 29, 1997, at 1.
7. Kasayev, supra note 5, at 1.
8. Both Yeltsin and Maskhadov have faced overwhelming hostility from their
respective Russian and Chechen constituencies. The Russian parliament initiated
impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin in 1999. See Yeltsin Likely to Face Mid-March
Impeachment Vote, AssocIATED PRESs, Feb. 18, 1999. While there is little chance the
impeachment effort will succeed, among the five charges garnering the most support in
parliament is the allegation of misconduct in launching the war in Chechnya. See id.
Maskhadov has faced the constant threat of ouster by militant Islamic factions who
accuse him of being too cooperative with Russia. See Ruslan Musayev, Islamic Law
Adopted in Chechnya, AssOCIATED PEss, Feb. 4, 1999.
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viding for Chechnya's full independence. 9 With neither side expressing
any willingness to compromise on the issue of Chechnya's status, it is diffi-
cult to envision an effective resolution of this conflict based solely on the
Khasavyurt Accords.
The thesis of this note is that such a permanent agreement can be
reached, though not to the improvement of the conditions of chaos and
banditry that currently reign in Chechnya. Part I briefly surveys the his'-
tory of Russian-Chechen hostilities, the most recent war between Russia
and Chechnya, and the course of events since the end of the war. Part II
examines the Russian-Chechen agreements in light of the Russian Federa-
tion's new constitution. Part III sets forth three proposals for a constitu-
tionally-sound resolution to the conflict. The note concludes that the most
realistic and practicable solution to the impasse is a regional autonomy
arrangement between Chechnya and the Russian Federation granting
Chechnya a "special status" among the constituent republics of the
Federation.
I. Background
A. Invasion of the Northern Caucasus: Chechenya Under Tsarist
Russia
The Russian poet Mikhail Lermantov wrote of the Chechen people in 1832,
"Their god is freedom, their law is war." 10 For over three centuries, the
Chechens have refused to peacefully assimilate into Russian and Soviet
society or acquiesce to the rule of the Tsars, communists, and now the
democratically elected Russian government." Russia's systematic attempt
to pacify the Chechens and occupy their land began in 1783, when Tsar
Nicholas II directed his imperial army to invade the Northern Caucasus
under the guise of protecting neighboring Russian Christians from the war-
ring native tribes of Muslim bandits. 12 It is more likely that the Tsar
desired this valuable land to serve as a strategic buffer between Russia and
neighboring Islamic territories. 13
The war between Russia and Chechnya, and the systematic subjuga-
tion and colonization of the Northern Caucasus that followed, lasted for
over eighty years, much longer than anticipated by the Tsar.14 Nicholas
9. See Russia and Chechnya: One Year Without War, supra note 4, at 1.
10. Edward Klein, The Conflict in Chechnya (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://
www.wdn.com/asf/chechbp.html>.
11. See David Remnick, Letter From Chechnya: In Stalin's Wake, NEw YORKER, July
24, 1995, at 49.
12. See Ruth Daniloff, Ignoring History in Chechnya, BosToN GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1994, at
1.
13. See id.
14. See CHRISTOPHER PANICO, CONFLICT STUD. No. 281, CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS:
RUSSIA'S WAR IN CHECHNYA 20 n.1 (1995) at 2. Chechen leader Sheykh Mansur
responded to the Russian invasion by declaring a holy war (jihad) against the Russian
invaders in 1785. The Russians and Chechens both engaged in the kind of warfare in
which they were accustomed. See Alton Donnly, The Mobil Steppe Frontier: The Russian
Conquest and Colonization of Bashkiria and Kazakhstan to 1850, in RussIAuN COLONIAL
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could not understand how his great army, which had recently defeated
Napoleon, failed to overtake the small, primitive region.' 5 However, to
those who observed the Chechen people and culture, the fierce resistance
was unsurprising. 16 For example, the Russian scholar Pluton Zubov
observed during the war that the Chechens were "remarkable for [their]
love of plunder, robbery and murder, for [their] spirit of deceit, courage,
recklessness, resolution, cruelty, fearlessness, [their] uncontrollable inso-
lence and unlimited arrogance," and concluded that "[t]he only way to deal
with this ill-intentioned people is to destroy it to the last."'17 The Tsar's
"counter insurgency" campaign against the Chechens is following the war
marked the beginning of an effort to follow through on the course of action
articulated and advocated by Zubov. The Chechens were relocated to areas
easily controlled by Tsarist forces and replaced by populations of Cos-
sacks. The oppressive campaign was led by Russian General Aleksei
Ermolov (1816-26),' 9 who desired that "the terror of my name should
guard our frontiers more potently than chains of fortresses, that my word
should be for the natives a law more inevitable than death. '20 After several
years of oppressive rule the Chechens were left, for a time, to live in relative
autonomy, as Russia's attention was diverted toward bigger conflicts in
other regions of the world.21
B. Finishing the Tsar's Initiative: Chechen Suffering Under Soviet Rule
The rise of the Bolsheviks brought chaos to the Russian empire, and the
people of the Northern Caucasus used the opportunity to band together
and declare their independence. 22 Both the Red and White Armies23
ExPANSION TO 1917, at 162 (Michael Rywkin ed., 1988). The Russians engaged in West-
ern-style battle with infantries, formal battles, superior fire power, and scorched-earth
tactics. See id. The Chechens in contrast used more primitive cavalry and hit-and-run
raids. See id.
15. See Daniloff, supra note 12, at 1.
16. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. Among the key characteristics of
Chechen culture that made them formidable opponents to invaders was their "extreme
vigilance over their freedom and the strong rejection of any authority external to the
tribe or clan." MosHE GAMMER, MUSLIM RESISTANCE TO THE TSAR 21 (1994). The Chechen
mountaineers, as they were known, raised their children to be warriors. Their bravery,
horsemanship, mastery of daggers, swords and muskets, and ability to camouflage were
renowned by the Russians. See id.
17. Remnick, supra note 11, at 49.
18. See PANico, supra note 14, at 3.
19. For an interesting discussion on Ermolov's role in Chechnya, see GAMMER, supra
note 16, at 29-38.
20. GAmMER, supra note 16, at 34. Ermolov was reprimanded by Tsars Alexander I
and Nicholas I for his cruelty. See id.
21. See Remnick, supra note 11, at 49.
22. See Klein, supra note 10, at 2.
23. The Red Army consisted of Bolshevik-led revolutionary soldiers who toppled the
Provisional Government of Russia, led by Alexander Kerensley, in the "Great October
Revolution" of 1917. See NicoL s V. R AsANovsKY, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 461 (1993).
Civil was erupted after the revolution primarily between the Red Army and counter-
revolutionary forces called the "White Movement." See id. at 479. The counter-revolu-
tionaries were mainly composed of army officers, cossacks, and members of the bour-
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sought the region as their prize.24 The anti-Bolshevik army advanced into
the region first, but quickly retreated due to the natives' strong resist-
ance.25 The Soviet Socialist Autonomous Mountain Republic formed in.
1921 with consent of the native Caucasians, who accepted Soviet sover-
eignty in exchange for the Republic's full autonomy in its domestic laws
and affairs and the transfer back of lands taken by the Tsars.26 The follow-
ing year, the Soviet government disbanded the Mountain Republic and
merged Chechnya with neighboring Ingushetia as the Chechen-Ingush
Autonomous Oblast of the Russian Federation.27 The rise of anti-Soviet
sentiment during this period was driven by the collectivization campaign
of 1929 and the purges of 1936-38, which led to the execution and intern-
ment of thousands of Chechens.28
Joseph Stalin, upon his ascent to power, resolved to finish the task
begun by the Tsar a century earlier: the obliteration of Chechnya and the
Chechens. 29 On Red Army Day in 1944, Soviet officers infiltrated every
Chechen and Ingush town and village, rounded up the indigenous popula-
tions at gunpoint, and loaded them onto cattle cars for deportation to
Kazakhstan and Kirgystan. 30 Two years later, the government officially
charged those exiled with conspiring with German forces and, "together
with German troops, engag[ing] in armed struggle against units of the Red
Army," though German troops never came within fifty miles of the
region.31
One-fourth of the Chechen population perished in the first five years
of exile, excluding the thousands who died in transit.3 2 Russian Constitu-
tional Court Justice Ernest Ametistov recalled the arrival of the exiled
Chechens to his hometown in Northern Kazakhstan and observed, "I think
such horrors become embedded, genetically, in the consciousness of a peo-
ple."33 At the same time, however, the collective strength and rebellious
spirit of the people remained intact, perhaps even bolstered somewhat by
geoisie and political groups. See id. The Red Army overpowered and effectively defeated
the Whites by the end of 1920. See id. at 483.
24. See Klein, supra note 10, at 2.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 3.
27. See id. Ingushetia is a 4300 sq. km. republic in southern Russia next to
Chechnya, which was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1810. See Encarta Encyclope-
dia, Ingushetia (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.encarta.msn.com>. The Inguish
people are mostly agrarian. See id. Like the Chechens, the Ingush are Muslim. Ingushe-
tia separated from Chechnya and formed its own constituent republic when the latter
declared its independence. See id. See also Moshe Gammer, Unity, Diversity and Conflict
in the Northern Caucasus, in MusLuM EURASIA: CONFUCTING LEGACIES 164-71 (Yaacov
Ro'l ed. 1995).
28. See Klein, supra note 10, at 3.
29. See Remnick, supra note 11, at 49.
30. See WILLIAM FLEMING, THE DEPORTATION OF THE CHECHN AND INGUISH PEOPLES: A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION IN RUSSIA AND CHEcHNYA: THE PE mANENT CISIs 70 (Ben Fowkes
ed., 1998).
31. EDGAR O'BALLANCE, WARS IN THE CAUCASUS, 1990-1995, at 165 (1997).
32. See PANIcO, supra note 14, at 3-4.
33. Remnick, supra note 11, at 51.
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the hardship of forced exile. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, while himself in
exile, observed:
there was one nation that would not give in, would not acquire the mental
habits of submission - and not just individual rebels among them, but the
whole nation to a man. These were the Chechens. They were capable of
rustling cattle, robbing a house, or sometimes simply taking what they
wanted by force. They respected only rebels. And here is an extraordinary
thing - everyone was afraid of them. No one could stop them from living as
they did. The regime which had ruled the land for thirty years could not
force them to respect its laws.3 4
The Chechens and Ingush returned to their homeland in 1957, after Khrus-
chev made his "secret" speech to the Twentieth Party Congress exposing
Stalin's crimes and declaring that the treatment of the Chechen and Ingush
had been a mistake. 35
C. Post-Soviet Chechnya: The Rise of Dzhokar Dudaev and the War for
Independence
Upon the Chechens' return from exile, Russian-Chechen hostilities
remained at bay until the attempted putsch against Soviet Premier Mikhail
Gorbachev in 1991.36 The rise of Gorbachev and the series of reforms
launched by him under Glasnost 3 7 and Perestroika 38 in the late 1980s were
slow to penetrate the Northern Caucasus.3 9 Even the strong separatist
movements in neighboring Georgia and Azerbaijan failed to have any signif-
icant impact on Communist rule in Chechnya-Ingushetia, which remained
constant and instituted few changes. 40
It was not until the Communist hard-liners' attempt to overthrow
Gorbachev that nationalist fervor reignited in the region.4 1 Former Soviet
Airforce General Dzhokar Dudaev42 was elected as chairman of the All-
National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCCP), where he and his fol-
lowers condemned the hard-liners responsible for the coup and actively
supported Boris Yeltsin's efforts to oppose them.4 3 Yeltsin, in turn, initially
welcomed and supported their efforts to oust the Communist leadership in
the region.44 At one point Yeltsin even went so far as to encourage minori-
34. Klein, supra note 10, at 4 (quoting Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipel-
ago (Thomas P. Whitney trans., Harper Collins, 1st ed. 1997) (1973).
35. See Remnick, supra note 11, at 51.
36. See PAuico, supra note 14, at 4.
37. Glasnost is the Russian word for "openness."
38. Perestroika is the Russian word for "reconstruction" and "reorganization."
39. See O'BALLANcE, supra note 31, at 165.
40. See id.
41. See PAuico, supra note 14, at 4-5.
42. Dudaev was the first Soviet general of Chechen ethnicity, and the former com-
mander of the Soviet airforce base in Estonia. See Valery Tishkov, Explaining and Catego-
rizing the Chechen War, in CONFLICTS IN THE CAucAsus 27-28 (Oavel Baev & Ole
Berthelsen eds., 1996).
43. See O'BAL-AcE, supra note 31, at 166. Dudaev organized demonstrations in
support of Yeltsin, and called for strikes and mass disobedience. See id.
44. See Tishkov, supra note 42, at 28.
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ties to "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow."45
Just as the Chechens looked upon the chaos of the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion as their ticket to independence, Dudaev and his supporters seized
upon the collapse of the U.S.S.R. as their chance for sovereignty.4 6 Yeltsin's
support for Dudaev quickly dwindled as the latter's intentions became
clear to the Russian leader. Dudaev's consolidation of power in the two
months following the attempted coup in Moscow culminated in his elec-
tion as Chechen President and proclamation that Chechnya was officially
independent, both of which occurred in the span of one week.
4 7
Yeltsin responded to the events by immediately declaring a state of
emergency in Chechnya. 48 This tactic proved counter-productive, however,
as the emergency decree effectively mobilized nationalist feelings and unity
among the Chechens in light of the Russian threat and weakened anti-
Dudaev forces. 4 9 The same day Yeltsin declared emergency rule, Dudaev
canceled the declaration and installed martial law in its place. Chechen
national guard troops mobilized to surround the 1000 Russian Interior
Ministry troops that had arrived and 30,000 demonstrators took to the
streets.5 0 The Russian Parliament voted overwhelmingly to rescind the
emergency order two days after it was imposed, and subsequently voted to
conduct negotiations with Dudaev.51 The Parliamentary response
reflected Russian opposition to Gorbachev's recent use of force to counter
nationalist movements in Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia and Azerbaijan. 52
An extended stalemate ensued through 1992-93.5 3 Reaching the nego-
tiating table proved difficult, as Dudaev's support was founded upon his
unwavering defiant nationalism, with Russia as his most ready and most
effective target.5 4 Russia offered to recognize the legitimacy of Dudaev's
presidency in exchange for his signature on the Federation Treaty acknowl-
edging Chechnya's membership in the Russian Federation.5 5 Dudaev
refused to waver from his earliest vow to accept nothing less than full inde-
45. CARLOTTA GALL & CHARLEs DE WAAL, CHECHNYA: CALAMITY IN THE CAUcASUS 319-
20 (1998).
46. See Tishkov, supra note 42, at 28.
47. Dudaev was elected president of Chechnya on October 27, 1991, and the
Chechen government declared the Republic's independence from the USSR and RSFSR
on November 2, 1991. See Pumco, supra note 14, at 7.
48. See Tishkov, supra note 42, at 29. Chechnya never signed the Russian Federation
Treaty, but it was widely rumored that Dudaev was prepared to do so if Yeltsin recog-
nized his election as Chechen President as legitimate. See O'BALLANCE, supra note 31, at
170.
49. See PANico, supra note 14, at 7. See also John Kohan, Fire in the Caucasus, TIME,
Dec. 12, 1994, at 36.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Dudaev was left alone by Yeltsin due to the latter's struggle to stay in power. See
O'BtALLAcE, supra note 31, at 175. It was only after Yeltsin was re-elected in 1993 that
he was secure enough in his position to turn his attention to the Chechen problem. See
id.
54. See PANico, supra note 14, at 7.
55. See id. at 11.
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pendence for Chechnya.5 6 In response, Russia increased military pressure
and imposed an economic blockade on the region.5 7 The critical economic
situation that ensued led to the Chechen Parliamentary opposition's sup-
port of normalizing relations with Moscow while retaining Chechen
sovereignty.58
The Dudaev regime responded to the opposition by becoming increas-
ingly undemocratic. Dudaev dismissed the Parliament, Constitutional
Court, and the Grozny National Assembly, 59 and disbanded demonstra-
tions calling for a referendum on the matter.60 These actions alienated
many of Dudaev's allies and powerful Chechen leaders. 61 The Parliament
struck back at the leader by initiating impeachment proceedings against
him and scheduling a public referendum on the competence of the Presi-
dent and the necessity of the office of president.62 On the evening before
the scheduled referendum, Dudaev's forces stormed opposition headquar-
ters and dispersed opposition demonstrators, killing as many as fifty peo-
ple.63 When the Constitutional Court ruled that his disbandment of the
Chechen Parliament was unconstitutional, Dudaev responded by shutting
down the Court.64
Massive conflict erupted among the various opposition factions and
the Dudaev government in 1994.65 The Russian government actively sup-
ported the opposition, and supplied them with funds, weaponry, and, even-
tually, the assistance of Russian intelligence services who conducted air
attacks in Russian helicopters and engaged in a so called "hidden war."66
This played right into the hands of Dudaev, who pointed to the groups as
traitorous pawns of the Russian Government. 67 In November, the Russian
Federal Intelligence Service (F.S.K.) 68 mounted an ill-fated invasion of
Grozny. Most of the Chechen opposition that pledged to participate in the
attack backed out at the last minute.69 The mission was disastrous for the
Russians, who were overwhelmingly defeated by Dudaev's forces.70
Chechen forces captured seventy Russian soldiers, and after initial denials,
the Russian Government eventually acknowledged the involvement of Rus-
56. See id.
57. See PAVEL BaEv, RussiA's POLICIES IN THE CAucAsus 52 (The Royal Institute for
International Affairs 1997).
58. See PANico, supra note 14, at 9.
59. See Tishkov, supra note 42, at 29.
60. See PANIco, supra note 14, at 9.
61. See BaEv, supra note 57, at 53.
62. See PA ico, supra note 14, at 9.
63. See id.
64. See id. This happened one day prior to the violence at opposition headquarters.
See id.
65. See id. at 10.
66. See id. at 14.
67. See id. at 10.
68. The intelligence service is known as the Federal'naya Sluzhba Kontrrazvedky.
The FSK is the successor to the domestic division of the former Komiter Gosudarstvennoi
Bezopasnosti (K.G.B).
69. See Remnick, supra note 11, at 55.
70. See id.
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sian troops in the operation.71
The first meeting between a senior Russian official and Dudaev took
place on December 6, 1994.72 While they reached no resolution to the
conflict, both Dudaev and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev vowed
publicly that there would be no resort to military action.73 Two days later
President Yeltsin issued Decree No. 2166, "On Measures to End the Activity
of Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory of the Chechen Republic
* . ."74 The decree authorized "Operation Wave," directing the Russian
Government "to use all available state means to ensure the security of the
state, the rule of law, civil rights and liberties, the defense of public order,
the fight against crime, and the disarming of all illegal formations." 75 Yelt-
sin kept this decree secret from the public, the Parliament, and most of his
own advisers. 76 On December 11, the Russian armed forces commenced
attack and invaded Chechnya from the north, east and west.7 7
Yeltsin's course of action illustrates his reliance on Grachev's boastful
assurances that the Russian offensive against Chechnya would take a
couple of hours.78 In reality, the Russian troops had barely more than a
week to prepare for the invasion, in contrast to the Chechen forces who had
been preparing since Dudaev declared independence four years earlier.
79
Commenting on Russia's utter lack of preparedness, retired Russian Gen-
eral Eduard Vorobyov, who refused Grachev's order to head the Russian
forces in Chechnya, said, "my God, our tank troops went into battle not
even having maps of the city!"80
Lacking well-trained ground forces, the Russians relied on heavy artil-
lery and extensive air raids to destroy the relatively small bands of rebel
fighters.8 1 Their forces destroyed countless villages and cities and killed
thousands of civilians with indiscriminate shelling.82 Huge segments of
the Chechen population that had been neutral throughout the conflict
wholeheartedly supported Dudaev after seeing their homes destroyed and
family and friends murdered. Russian Human Rights Commissioner
Sergei Kovalev estimated that there were 24,000 civilian casualties between
November 25, 1994 and January 25, 1995.83 Grozny fell to the Russians
71. See PANIco, supra note 14, at 14-15.
72. See id.
73. See Alessandra Stanley, War Threat in Caucasus Is Averted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1994, at 11.
74. Klein, supra note 10, at 11.
75. Id.
76. See Remnick, supra note 11, at 55.
77. See PANico, supra note 14, at 15.
78. See Remnick, supra note 11, at 56.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 59.
81. See PA a'co, supra note 14, at 16.
82. See id.
83. See Pontus Siren, The Battle for Grozny: The Russian Invasion of Chechnya,
December 1994 - December 1996, in RussiA AND CHECHNYA, THE PEMNENr CRIsS 130
(Ben Fowkes ed., 1998).
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by mid-February 1995.84 The tactics employed by the Russians were
described by emergency management consultant Frederick Cuny, who was
in Grozny at that time and was later murdered there under mysterious
circumstances:
To put the intensity of the firing in perspective, the highest level of firing
recorded in Sarajevo was 3500 heavy detonations per day. In Grozny in
early February, a colleague of mine counted 4000 detonations per hour.
Only in early March did the Russians diminish their shelling and adopt a
strategy of starving out the local population. 85
The war raged on for twenty-one months, punctuated by failed cease
fires, annihilation of Chechen villages and their civilian population, and
the invasion of Chechen rebels into neighboring Russian towns. Rebel
leader Dudaev was killed in April 1996 - a Russian missile launched from
a war plane reportedly homed in on signals from his satellite telephone.8 6
Over 1500 Chechen rebels recaptured most of Grozny in a surprise offen-
sive in early August 1996.87 On August 12, 1996, the newly appointed
head of Yeltsin's National Security Counsel, retired Russian General Alek-
sandr Lebed,8 8 traveled to Khasavyurt, Dagestan to negotiate with
Chechen representatives. 8 9 Lebed made this journey on his own initiative
with no support from Yeltsin. 90 Less than three weeks later on August 31,
Lebed and rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov signed a landmark accord in
Khasavyurt, Dagestan, averting an all-out Russian offensive in Grozny.9 t
These Khasavyurt Accords ended the war and demilitarized Chechnya,
while postponing a decision on the region's political status until December
31, 2001.92 The casualties of the Chechen war are estimated between
30,000 and 90,000.93
II. Analysis
A. The Khasavyurt Accords
The Chechen-Russian truce agreement is brief, ambiguous, and expressly
avoids resolving the deep-seeded conflict that ignited the war by deferring
84. See PANico, supra note 14, at 17.
85. Klein, supra note 10, at 12.
86. See GALL & DE WAAL, supra note 45, at 319-20.
87. See id. at 331. Grozny was fortified with an estimated 12,000 Russian troops.
See id. at 332.
88. After his retirement from the military, Lebed turned to politics and took third
place in Russia's 1996 presidential elections. See GALL & DE WAAL, supra note 45, at
376. Thereafter he was appointed by President Yeltsin as Secretary of the National
Security Counsel and Russian special Envoy to Chechnya. See id. He was fired from the
government in October 1996, two months after signing the peace accord with Chechen
leaders. See id.
89. Dagestan neighbors Chechnya and is one of the Russian Federation's constituent
republics. See ANATOL LIEVEN, CHECHNYA: TOMBSTONE OF RussIAN POWER 19-20 (1998).
90. See id.
91. See Hoffman, supra note 2, at Al.
92. See id.
93. See Siren, supra note 83, at 130; GALL & DE WAAL, supra note 45, at 360.
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a decision on Chechnya's status for five years. It is nonetheless important
and remarkable, however, in that it effectively ended the war.
On its face, the document is quite simple. It sets forth "Rules for Clari-
fying the Basis for Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and
the Chechen Republic," and consists of four provisions. 94 The first section
states that a treaty governing the relations between Russia and Chechnya,
to be governed by the norms and principles of international law, must be
reached prior to December 31, 2001. 95 The second section creates a Joint
Commission composed of Russian and Chechen officials to facilitate com-
plete withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechen territory, initiate and
implement measures to control crime and prejudice, make proposals for
developing monetary and budgetary mutual relations, develop programs
for the Russian Government to rebuild the socio-economic infrastructure of
Chechnya, and supervise agreements concerning supply and distribution
of food and medical aid.96 The third provision describes the basis of the
Chechen legal system, including the "right of nations toward self determi-
nation" and the "principles of equal rights of nations." 97 Finally, the
fourth provision provides that the Joint Commission mentioned in the sec-
ond provision will work until the parties mutually agree to disband.98
A second, short peace agreement to the same effect was subsequently
signed in May 199799 by President Yeltsin and Chechen President Asian
Maskhadov, who was elected by popular vote in January 1997.100 After the
signing of the treaty, Yeltsin predicted that "[w]ith the help of [other] agree-
ments, we will advance our relations in the economy, trade, and other
spheres." 10 1 Yeltsin's prophecy has thus far not come to fruition.10 2
Negotiations have been sporadic and unproductive. 10 3 While the Rus-
sian side is willing to grant Chechnya broad autonomy in exchange for
remaining within the Federation, the Chechens continue to proclaim their
94. See Russian-Chechen Truce Agreement, Aug. 25, 1996, Rus.-Chechnya (visited
Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.chechnya.org/constit.html> [hereinafter Khasavuyrt
Accords].
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. TREATY ON PEACE AND THE PRINCIPLES-OF MUTUAL RELATIONS BErWEEN THE RussAN
FEDERATION AND THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC OF ICHKERIA (1997), reprinted in STATUTES &
DECISIONS: THE LAwS OF THE USSR AND ITS SUCCESSOR STATES (Sarah J. Reynolds trans.,
July-Aug. 1998).
100. See GALL & DE WAAL, supra note 45, at 366. See Russia and Chechnya Sign Peace
Treaty, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SovIET PRESS, June 11, 1997, at 10.
101. Richard C. Paddock, Russians, Chechens Solidify Peace through Brief Treaty, L.A.
TIMES, May 13, 1997, at 2.
102. For example, Russia is currently considering the construction of a new oil pipe-
line to bypass Chechnya. This would effectively deny the Republic one of its key poten-
tial sources of income. See Sanobar Shermatova, Is Moscow Preparing for Chechnya's
Independence?, Moscow NEws, Sept. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library,
MOSNWS File.
103. See id.
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independence, a point which they refuse to negotiate. 1°4 Moreover, the
Chechen government has gone out of its way to defy Russian law."' 5 For
example, in September 1997, the Chechen government publicly executed
four convicted criminals by firing squad in violation of the Russian mora-
torium on capital punishment.1 6 Chechen officials claimed that the pun-
ishment was in accordance with Islamic Law.1 7 The Chechen government
also announced plans to issue its own passports."' 8 These tensions
between Russia and Chechnya have flared amidst a backdrop of chaos and
banditry in Chechnya, where over 400 Russians and foreigners have been
kidnapped since the end of the war in 1996.109
Each side is playing a "risky game of brinkmanship," testing the
other's resolve while stopping just short of resuming the war. 1 0 There is
presently no war in Chechnya, but it hardly seems accurate to characterize
the present state of affairs between Russia and Chechnya as peaceful.
104. See Oleg Shchedrov, Russia Says No Plans to Recognize Chechnya, REUTER, Sept.
25, 1997, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTNWS File.
105. See, e.g., Chechen Election Law at Variance with Russian Constitution, ITAR-TAss,
Jan. 27, 1997, at 1.
106. See Michael R. Gordon, Executions in Chechnya Flout Appeals from Russian Lead-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at A3.
107. See id.
108. See Rebel Chechnya Says to Issue Own Passports Soon, REUTERs, Oct. 7, 1997, at 1.
109. See Robert Parsons, Chechen President Orders Kidnap Crackdown, BBC NEws,
Dec. 13, 1998, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, BBCSWB File. A number of power-
ful kidnapping gangs emerged in Chechnya after the war ended. See id. Some of these
gangs proclaim to be Islamic militants bent on ridding the region of all Western influ-
ence. See id. The kidnappings are usually for ransom, and typically hostages are
released once the demanded sum is paid. See Ruslan Musayev, Western Hostages
Beheaded in Chechnya, Moscow TIMES, Dec. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, EUROPE
Library, MOSTMS File. Among those kidnapped was the Russian government's envoy to
Chechnya, Valentin Vlasov, who was taken in broad daylight by five gunmen and
released unharmed six months later. See Oksana Yablokova, Yeltsin's Chechen Envoy
Goes Free, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library,
MOSTMS File. Another Russian government official, an ethnic Uzbek and a Moslem,
was abducted in Chechnya after attending a speech by President Maskhadov on the kid-
napping crisis in the region. See Abducted Official Found Dead in Chechnya, Moscow
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1998, available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, MOSTMS File. Less than a
week after his abduction the official was found dead, and a note left with his body read:
"To all Russians who are hostile to Chechnya. Such will be the fate of everyone who is in
Chechnya and works for [Russian Intelligence]." Id. One of the most tragic and grue-
some episodes of abduction and murder occurred in December 1998, when the severed
heads of three Britons and one New Zealander kidnapped two months earlier were dis-
covered fined up on the side of a Chechen highway. See Ruslan Musayev, Western Hos-
tages Beheaded in Chechnya, Moscow TIMES, Dec. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, EUROPE
Library, MOSTMS File. The men were in Chechnya to install a satellite telecommunica-
tions system, and their murder prompted President Maskhadov to declare a state of
emergency in an attempt to quell the banditry in Chechnya. See Relatives Await Hostages'
Bodies, IRIsH TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998, available in LEXIS, MARKET Library, PROMT File;
Robert Parsons, Chechen President Orders Kidnap Crackdown, BBC NEws, Dec. 13, 1998,
available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, BBCSWB File.
110. Timothy Heritage, Russia-Chechnya Relations Face Big Tests After War, REuTERs,
Oct. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTNWS File.
Vol. 32
1999 The Khasavyurt Accords
B. Controversial Aspects of the Khasavyurt Accords
Brevity and ambiguity were elevated to an art form in the Khasavyurt
Accords. Masterful use of vague terms and intentional omissions allowed
each side to save face by reporting back to their constituencies with their
own subjective interpretation of the treaty's effect. Following the signing,
three aspects in particular were the subject of controversy: that interna-
tional law governs the agreement, the meaning and use of "right of nations
toward self-determination" and "the principles of equal rights of nations,"
and the five year moratorium on Chechnya's status.'
1. Governance of International Law
The provision in the Khasavyurt Accords that international law shall gov-
ern Russian-Chechen relations was a term for which the Chechen side
fought to the end.' 2 That international law will govern and not the Rus-
sian Constitution was a major concession won by the Chechens in their bid
for recognition; governance of international law is reserved for treaties
between independent states and not for domestic agreements. The term, in
effect, allowed the Chechens to broadcast the signing of a peace treaty
between states rather than a domestic agreement." 3 While this conces-
sion was made to end the war, the Russian spin on the provision is that
international law is a component of the Russian Federation's legal system,
and effectively part of Russian domestic law." 4 This is clearly expressed
in Article 15.4115 of the Russian Constitution. 116 A former Yeltsin Press
Secretary characterized the agreement and its terms as "more political-psy-
chological in nature than it is legal."" 7 Moreover, the extent to which the
international law provision may imply recognition of an independent
Chechnya is mitigated by the absence of any language regarding a com-
pletely independent status for Chechnya." 8
2. The Right to Self-Determination
Another aspect of the Khasavyurt Accords that the Chechens believe dem-
onstrates their independence is the provision recognizing that the Chechen
111. Dudaev issued a decree on January 19, 1994, that officially renamed the terri-
tory "The Chechen Republic - Ichkeriya." See JOHN P. DuNLop, RussIA CoNFRONTs
CHECHNYA 151 (1998).
112. See Russia and Chechnya Sign Peace Treaty, supra note 100, at 10.
113. See id. See also Kremlin Says Chechen Ties Meet International Norms, REuTR, May
12, 1997, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTNWS File.
114. See Russia and Chechnya Sign Peace Treaty, supra note 100, at 10.
115. KONST. RF (1993) art. 15, § 4. "Universally acknowledged principles and stan-
dards of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a
part of its legal system. Should an international treaty of the Russian Federation estab-
lish rules other then those established by law, the rules of the international treaty shall
be applied." Id.
116. The Constitution of the Russian Federation was approved in a national referen-
dum on December 12, 1993, and adopted after a final count of the votes. See CONsTrru-
TION OF THE RussIAN FEDERATION, SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL EDITION 15 (Vladimir V. Belyakov
& Walter J. Raymond eds., 1994).
117. Russia and Chechnya Sign Peace Treaty, supra note 100, at 10 (quoting Sergei
Yastrzhembsky, former Presidential Press Secretary).
118. See id.
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Republic's legal system is based "upon the right of nations toward self-
determination," and "upon the-principles of equal rights of nations."' 19
Specifically, the Chechen signatories viewed these provisions as creating
legal guidelines for international recognition of Chechnya as an independ-
ent, sovereign state. 120 Their position is bolstered by the omission of any
reference to the 1975 Helsinki Act, which provides that "nations [sic] (eth-
nic group[s]) can exercise their right to self-determination only within
existing state boundaries."121
The Russian position regarding the Republic's right to self-determina-
tion is that such right exists consistent with other sovereign parts of the
Federation.122 In other words, all of the constituent members of the Rus-
sian Federation are sovereign to varying degrees in accordance with power-
sharing treaties between each republic and the federal government. This is
the kind of relationship envisioned by the Russian government, and it
interprets the agreement's self-determination provisions as the framework
for such a bilateral treaty between the Federation and the Republic of
Chechnya. 123
3. The Five Year Moratorium
Perhaps the most controversial provision of the Khasavyurt Accords is the
five year moratorium on deciding Chechnya's status. 124 One factor con-
tributing to the controversy was the Accords' failure to mention Russia's
territorial integrity.125 President Yeltsin's main justification for the war
was to preserve this territorial integrity and thus conform to the Russian
Constitution, which impliedly prohibits secession. 126 Such an important
omission could indicate that recognition of an independent Chechnya
remains a possibility, which in turn would dearly run counter to the
Constitution.127
In sum, the ambiguities in the Khasavyurt accords are numerous and
deliberate. All of the provisions in controversy revolve around the issue
that instigated the war: the status of Chechnya. The Chechens view the
terms as a precursor for full recognition as an independent state, while
Russia interprets the agreement as providing for Chechen sovereignty
119. KHASAVYURT AccoRDs, supra note 94.
120. See Nikolai Vavilov, Khasavyurt Accords Were Signed Year Ago, RussLAN PREsS DIG.,
Aug. 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, SPD File.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. KHmSAVYURT AccoRDs, supra note 94.
125. See Vladimir Guliyev & Alla Barakhova, Critics of Lebed and Mashhadov Are Not
Right, RussIAN PREsS DIG., Oct. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, SPD File.
126. See Russia and Chechnya Sign Peace Treaty, supra note 100, at 10.
127. See Konstantin Katanyan, Yeltsin Cannot Grant Chechnya Independence,
NEZAviSIMAYA GAZErA, Aug. 22, 1997, at 2. See also Pavel Felgenhaur, No Hope for Inde-
pendence, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, MOSTMS
File (arguing that if "Yeltsin promotes or abets any vague agreement that can be inter-
preted by the Chechens as conceding some form of sovereignty, he can be accused of
violating his presidential oath.").
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within the Russian Federation.128 The surprising culprit behind this dead-
end impasse, and arguably the war itself, is the Russian Constitution.
Problems and loopholes in the Constitution along with possible constitu-
tionally compatible resolutions to the conflict are addressed in the follow-
ing section.
C. The Russian Constitution - Instigator of Hostilities and Barrier to
Peace?
The Russian Constitution was adopted by referendum in December 1993
in the immediate aftermath of President Yeltsin's violent confrontation
with his Vice President and the Russian Supreme Soviet.129 Support for
both the government and democracy were at a low point, and Yeltsin
wanted a new constitution in place in order to move forward with his
reformist agenda.130 To ensure that Parliament's anti-reform oppositionist
members could not tamper with this new constitution, the drafters aimed
to effectively "lock in democracy with a nearly unamendable constitu-
tion."131 Another concern of the government at the time was that the
atmosphere of chaos in the country and unrest in some of the republics
would lead to the disintegration of Russia, as happened with the U.S.S.R.
two years earlier.132 Thus, there was no serious discussion or debate about
omitting any provision on secession from the Constitution. The drafters
assumed that allowing it would spark secessionist movements and hasten
Russia's demise.133 On this assumption, the Constitution's sponsors took
the gamble that the Constitution would be able to handle all existing and
future problems. The Russian leadership is now paying for this risk with
regard to Chechnya.134
1. Relevant Constitutional Provisions on Secession and the Limits of Local
Powers
There are no provisions in the Russian Constitution regarding secession.
Moreover, constitutional articles pertaining to Russian territory imply that
secession is unconstitutional. Article 4 is the key provision: Article 4.1
states that the "sovereignty of the Russian Federation shall extend to its
128. See id.
129. See Edward W. Walker, Constitutional Obstacles to Peace in Chechnya, EAsT EUR.
CONST. REv., Winter 1997, at 55. The violent events that took place in Moscow Oct. 3-4,
1993, ended the standoff between President Yeltsin and anti-reformist members of the
Russian Parliament, with whom then Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi sided. Yeltsin
tried to dissolve Parliament the month prior, but certain deputies refused to obey and
installed Rutskoi as the Russian President. Rutskoi and the conservative deputies armed
themselves and took over the parliament building in Moscow, known as the "White
House." After three days of violent clashes throughout the city, the events culminated on
October 4, when tanks rolled up to the White House and shelled it for most of the day.
This was accompanied by sniper fire by both sides. Official reports tolled the dead at
146, with approximately 1000 injured. See id.
130. See id. at 55.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 59.
133. See id. at 58-59.
134. See id. at 59.
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entire territory"; 135 Article 4.2 states that "[t]he Constitution of the Rus-
sian Federation and federal laws shall have priority throughout the terri-
tory of the Russian Federation";136 and Article 4.3 states that the "Russian
Federation shall ensure the integrity and inviolability of its territory."'137
Article 80, in turn, mandates that the President "take measures to protect
the sovereignty, independence and state integrity of the Russian Federation
and ensure the coordinated action and interaction of the bodies of state
authority."'13 8 Article 65.1 includes "the Chechen Republic" as an enumer-
ated constituent republic of the Russian Federation. 139 Although
Chechnya had already declared its independence when this new constitu-
tion was being drafted, the drafters and voters who ratified the document
understood Chechnya to be part of the Russian Federation. Further, the
international community recognized the Russian Federation based on the
Soviet-era Russian borders, which included Chechnya as part of the
Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic. 140
The Russian Constitution confers benefits on local constituents and
places certain restrictions on the reach of local governments. 14 1 Article 6
provides for equal rights among all citizens of the Russian Federation. 14 2
Article 32 allows public participation in elections, referenda, and in public
affairs. 143 Article 46.1 guarantees access to and protection by the judici-
ary.14 4 Articles 57 and 59 impose affirmative duties of the citizens to pay
taxes, and where legally mandated, serve in the military. 145
The Russian' Constitution's limits on local powers are mostly confined
to the economic sphere and protection of individual rights. Article 74.1
bans internal customs frontiers and other trade restrictions. 14 6 Article
14.2 is similar to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
separating church and state and mandating that all religions be treated as
equal before the law.147 Article 19.2 guarantees equal protection with
regard to "sex, race, nationality, language, [and] origin," among other sta-
tus.14 8 Article 75.1 disallows use of currency other than the Russian
ruble. 14 9 Finally, Article 95 obligates each member of the Russian Federa-
tion to send representatives to the bicameral legislature. Two representa-
135. KONST. RF (1993) art. 4, § 1.
136. Id. art. 4, § 2.
137. Id. art. 4, § 3.
138. Id. art. 80.
139. See id. art. 65, § 1.
140. See Walker, supra note 129, at 56.
141. Part of the hostilities between the Russian and Chechen authorities revolves
around the Chechen government's imposition of local laws and regulations that go
beyond its local power and violate several provisions of the Russian constitution. See
supra notes 48-64.
142. See KONST. RF (1993) art. 6.
143. See id. art. 32.
144. See id. art. 46, § 1.
145. See id. arts. 57, 59.
146. See id. art. 74, § 1.
147. See id. art. 14, § 2.
148. Id. art. 19, § 2.
149. See id. art. 75, § 1.
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tives from each local government serve on the Federation Council (upper
house), and elected representatives from each republic sit in the Duma
(lower house).' 50
2. The Russian Constitution as It Relates to the Chechen War
The constitutional provisions listed above are of key importance in under-
standing the Chechen war, the subsequent settlement, and the lingering
problems between Russia and Chechnya. The initial intervention and inva-
sion of Chechnya was legally justified by the Russian Government under
several provisions. First, Article 71.1 empowers the President "to protect
the sovereignty, independence and integrity" of the Russian Federation. 15 '
Second, the article gives the federal government exclusive control over
defense and security.' 5 2 Further, the Russian Government justified its
intervention by pointing to the Chechen government's flagrant violations
of the numerous provisions limiting the power of local governments.
5 3
The twenty-one month war did nothing to improve the situation in
Chechnya. While the Chechen government elected after the war was the
one most agreeable to Moscow at the time of the elections, it still engages
in practices that are in direct violation of the Russian Constitution.' 5 4 The
Chechen leaders believe the Republic to be independent and insist upon
reparations from the Russian government to rebuild their destroyed coun-
try.155 The Russian government rejects their claim of independence. 156 As
a result, the post-Khasavyurt negotiations have encountered the same stale-
mate that caused the war. The root of this seemingly endless impasse is
Article 65157 of the Russian Constitution and the lack of a constitutional
mechanism for secession.158 The Russian government believes that it can-
not accept Chechen independence within the bounds of the current Rus-
sian Constitution.15 9
If amending the Russian Constitution was a realistic option, the most
direct way to resolve the problem would be to amend the Constitution
either to allow secession or to exclude the Chechen Republic from Article
65. Chapter 9 of the Russian Constitution contains the procedure by
which the Constitution can be amended. To amend chapters 1, 2 or 9 - the
fundamental chapters - it is necessary for three-fifths of the Federation
150. See id. art. 95.
151. Id. art. 71.1.
152. SeeJames S. Robbins, Sovereignty Building: The Case of Chechnya, 21 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 17, 28.
153. See supra notes 48-64.
154. See Shermatova, supra note 102, at 1.
155. See Vladimir Shpak, It is Necessary to Talk with Chechens in Chechen Lingo, Rus-
siAN Pxss DiG., Aug. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, SPD File.
156. See Robbins, supra note 152, at 31.
157. Article 65 lists the Chechen Republic as a constituent republic of the Russian
Federation. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
158. See Walker, supra note 129, at 55-56.
159. See Valery Shanayev, Peace in Chechnya Must Be Reached on Constitutional Basis,
ITAR-TAss, Oct. 4, 1996, at 1.
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Counsel and the State Duma to vote for a Constitutional Assembly.160
This Assembly will then have the option of either "confirm[ing] the immu-
tability of the Constitution of the Russian Federation or drafting a new
Constitution of the Russian Federation."'16 1 Drafting a new Constitution
would require two-thirds of the votes of all assembly members or a nation-
wide simple majority on a referendum (Article 135).162
Amending Chapters 3-8 of the Constitution is almost as impracticable:
it requires approval of three-fourths of the Federation Counsel, two-thirds
of the State Duma, and two-thirds of the legislatures of the eighty-nine
members of the Russian Federation. 163 Article 137 specifically addresses
amendments to Article 65, the article addressing the constituent territories
of the Russian Federation, but only with regard to additions, name
changes, and territorial-status changes. 164 Secession is not mentioned. 165
Essentially, the Constitution's drafters were successful in making their
unamendable constitution"' 66 - the requirements of Chapter 9 are so
onerous as to be nearly impossible. 16 7 Thus, as the Russian Constitution
currently exists, a simple or conventional resolution to the Chechen con-
flict is not possible. However, constitutional interpretation is still in its
160. See KONsT. RF (1993) art. 135, § 2.
161. Id. art. 135, § 3.
162. See id. art. 135, § 2.
163. See id. art. 136.
164. See id. art. 137.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Russia scholar Edward W. Walker cites two alternatives that, in hindsight, would
have been more prudent for the Russians to consider:
As the Georgian Constitution was being drafted in early 1995, its sponsors were
acutely aware of Tbilisi's violent conflicts with... regional tensions throughout
the country ... [and] therefore decided that provisions on the relative powers of
the national government and the regions should be omitted from the Constitu-
tion's text and that Georgia should, for the time being at least, establish a uni-
cameral legislature .... With the benefit of hindsight, the drafters of the Russian
constitution might have been wise to adopt a similar approach with Chechnya.
As the Russian Constitution was being drafted, Chechnya had already declared
its independence and refused to participate in the writing of the federal constitu-
tion. Under these circumstances, savvy constitutional drafters could have
decided to leave Chechnya out of the list of republics in Art. 65 and to include a
provision stating that Chechnya's status would be determined at a later date.
Alternatively, Art. 65 could have been made easier to amend.
Walker, supra note 129, at 59.
A second option would have been to include a provision on secession in the constitu-
tion. See id. Walker argues that this inclusion would have actually protected and
enhanced the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. See id.
Procedures for [secession] ... could have been made burdensome, [for example,
by requiring] two referendums five years apart in which at least 60 percent of
the electorate in a particular member of the Federation voted for independence.
Only in Chechnya might popular support for secession have been sufficient to
meet these terms. And even in Chechnya, a realistic exit option for Chechnya
might have ameliorated tensions and avoided the war. Alternatively, it might
have postponed a crisis long enough for Dudaev, who was deeply unpopular in
Chechnya prior to the war, to lose power, at which point it might have been
possible to negotiate autonomy for Chechnya on the Tartarstan model.
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formative stage, as many of the Constitution's ambiguities have not been
subject to interpretation by the new Russian Constitutional Court.168 A
few "backdoor" alternatives may hold the key to finding a settlement satis-
factory to both sides.
III. Resolving the Status of Chechnya: Three Proposals
Three possible approaches may guide the Russians and Chechens down
the path towards a permanent settlement. The first option is to amend
Article 65 of the Russian Constitution in accordance with Article 138 to
allow a special status for Chechnya. The second is to hold a nationwide
referendum on the status of Chechnya. A final option involves the ques-
tions of whether or not Chechnya actually seceded, and whether interna-
tional law would define Chechnya as an independent state.
A. Amending Article 65 or Granting a Special Status to Chechnya
Article 65 lists the members of the Russian Federation, and it can be
amended in accordance with Article 137. Article 137.1 states that
[a]ny change in Article 65 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation,
establishing the make-up of the Russian Federation, shall be made on the
basis of the federal constitutional law on the Admission to the Russian Fed-
eration and creation within it of a new member to the Russian Federation
and on the change of the constitutional and legal status of a member of the
Russian Federation.169
Article 66.5 states that the "status of a member of the Russian Federation
may be altered by the mutual consent of the Russian Federation and the
member of the Russian Federation in accordance with a federal constitu-
tional law. 1 70
Based on these provisions, Russian Constitutional Court Chairman
Marat Bagley stated that "the status of the Chechen Republic should differ
from the status of other constituent parts of the Russian Federa-
tion... since the constitution envisages the possibility of changes in the
status of a Federation constituent part."1 71 Yeltsin's then National Security
Secretary Ivan Rybkin also acknowledged this possibility and went further
to say that the Chechens' desire to take over most government functions
would be acceptable to the Russian government as long as a single defense
Id.
See also Pavel Felgenhauer, A Chechnya Turning Point, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 22, 1996,
available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, MOSTMS File (commenting on the unlikelihood of
amending the Russian Constitution to allow secession).
168. See Press Conference with Constitutional Court Chair Marat Baglay, OFFIcL4. KuEM-
LIN INT'L NEws BROADCAST, Feb. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS
File [hearinafter BAGLAY INTERVIEW].
169. KONsT. RF (1993) art. 137, § 1 (emphasis added).
170. Id. art. 66, § 5.
171. Russian Constitutional Court Chief in Favor of Special Status for Chechnya, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BRoADcAsrs, Sept. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library,
BBCSWB File.
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and economy are preserved. 17 2
While the Russian Constitutional Court has thus far shied away from
controversial decisions and followed President Yeltsin's agenda, Baglay
stated upon his appointment as Chairman in February 1997 that, "[m]y
opinion and that of my colleagues is that by interpreting the Constitution
in the Constitutional Court, many vague parts of the Constitution could be
regulated. And it is necessary to initiate amendments there as soon as
possible."' 73
If Chechnya is granted special status, the more difficult issue will be
the nature of its relationship with Russia. The Russian Constitution allows
members of the Federation to conclude bilateral arrangements with the
federal government on the distribution of state and local power.174 The
first constitutional arrangement along these lines was concluded with
Tartarstan. 175 This treaty recognizes Tartarstan as a "state" that may par-
ticipate in international relations by establishing its own "relations with
foreign states" and conclud[ing] agreements with them."'17 6 Such agree-
ments must be consistent with the Russian Constitution and the interna-
tional obligations of the Russian Federation. 177
Tartarstan is an oil-producing region with important aircraft, automo-
tive, and electronic enterprises. 178 The Republic depends on federal mili-
tary orders to keep its industries running. 179 The treaty effectively granted
Tartarstan broad autonomy within the Federation while solidifying their
economic links with Russia on which their stability and growing prosperity
depend. Tartarstan has since opened trade offices, referred to as "embas-
sies," in Australia, Turkey, and other countries. 180 Only the Tartar flag
flies over the Republic's government buildings, and local automobile
license plates are unique to the Republic. 18 1
The "Tartarstan Model" would seem an ideal prototype for a treaty
between Russia and Chechnya on an economic level. However, an addi-
tional component accommodating the Chechens' right to Islamic self-iden-
tity would be requisite to any Russian-Chechen treaty.' 8 2 While both
Tartarstan and Chechnya are Muslim Republics, they interpret Islam differ-
ently. 183 Tartar nationalists take pride in their Europeanized Islam, and
172. See Russia, Chechnya to Speed Up Long-Term Peace Deal, CNN INErAcTIVE (Aug.
18, 1997) (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://cnn.com/world/9708/18/russia.chechnya/
index.html>
173. BAGLAY INTERVIEW, supra note 168.
174. See Gennady M. Danielenko, The New Russian Constitution and International
Law, 88 AMER J. INT'L L. 3, 457 (1994).
175. See id.
176. Danilenko, supra note 174, at 457.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See CarolJ. Williams, The Ethnic Patchwork is Fraying, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995,
at A6.
181. See id.
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"tend to regard religion primarily as a tool in their 'national liberation
struggle,' rather than its rationale; they see themselves as Muslim Tartars,
not Tartar Muslims." 184 In contrast, the Chechens view Islam as a way of
life as well as a religion.185 Just weeks after the war's end, the Chechen
government introduced a criminal code based on Muslim Sharia law into
the Republic, which is enforced both over and in violation of the Russian
Constitution.18 6 For example, public drinking is now forbidden, and pun-
ishable by up to forty lashes, and several public executions have taken
place.187 Most recently, President Maskhadov revoked the powers of the
Chechen Parliament and ordered the drafting of a new Islamic Constitu-
tion.188 If Chechnya is going to retain some status within the Russian Fed-
eration, it is clear that a treaty granting broad economic autonomy and
support will not be enough. If this "special status" scenario is to be real-
ized, Russia must recognize the establishment of Islam in Chechnya.' 8 9
This "special status," in turn, would require a special legal relation-
ship between the federal and republican entities. 190 For example, the
Sharia Court and law could be recognized as an autonomous component
of the Russian legal system. 191 Technically, Chechnya could retain a status
akin to that between Puerto Rico and the United States, or Hong Kong and
China.192 The risk that other Republics may make similar demands is not
184. Christian Caryl, Islam's Hotbed of Stability, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP. ON LINE,
Feb, 17, 1997, at 2.
185. Buyda, supra note 182, at 2. This was not always the case in Chechnya. Dudaev
was a prime example of a secular leader who, in times of crisis, used Islam as a political
tool to exploit certain ideas. See YAxov Ro'I, MusLiM EuRA4si CONFIICTING LEGAcIES 46
(1995). Dudaev initially rejected the idea of using Islam in politics. See id. However,
when his authority was weakened by oppositionists, he formed a bloc with religious
Islamic groups before the war, and called for the "formation of organs of state power in
the republic based on historical traditions of the Chechen nation, the principles of
Islam, the Shariat and the priority of human values." See id. at 46-47. Dudaev promul-
gated a new constitution in February 1993 that proclaimed Islam the state religion. See
id. at 47.
186. See Michael Specter, Russians Gone, Chechens Now 'Struggle for Allah,' Irrr'L HER-
ALD TRIB., Nov. 2, 1996, at 1. Chechen President Maskhadov also dissolved all secular
courts, announced plans to establish Islamic banks and introduce a new currency, and
post municipal signs in Arabic. See id. In addition, Chechyn Vice President Vakha Arsa-
nov recently announced a new rule that female students and civil servants must dress in
traditional Islamic clothing. See id.
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1999. Maskhadov's decision was the result of pressure from the militant Islamic opposi-
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so great; Islam and the separatist movement is much stronger in Chechnya
than in any of the other republics. 193
The foregoing proposal involves mutual compromise among the par-
ties, and may be the best plan for ensuring peace and some measure of
stability in Chechnya. However, granting Chechnya a special status in the
Federation would still require the passage of a constitutional amendment
or law to avoid violating several constitutional provisions on the supremacy
of federal law throughout the Federation. 194 Article 66.5 provides for a
constitutional law to govern a change of status as mutually agreed by the
Republic and Federation governments. 195 Based on this provision, it is fea-
sible for the Federation to pass a constitutional law recognizing the coexis-
tence of Sharia law in Chechnya based on the constitutionally protected
right to self-determination as set forth in the preamble and Article 5 of the
Russian Constitution.19 6
B. National Referendum on Status of Chechnya
A second possibility would be to hold a national referendum on the status
of Chechnya. This option has been advocated by certain Russian officials
and journalists as the only "constitutional way out of the impasse."19 7 Pre-
sumably, the authority to hold a national referendum on Chechnya would
be derived from Article 3 of the Constitution: Article 3.1 states that the
"multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation shall be the bearers of its
sovereignty and the sole source of authority in the Russian Federation";
China when it ceded from British control in 1997. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOV-
EREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 137
( 2n" ed. 1996). The terms of this status were set forth in a Joint Declaration between
China and the United Kingdom, and "the essential characteristic of this agreement is the
theory of 'one country, two systems' upon which it is based." See id. at 137. Hong Kong
is the first SAR in China, and China's policies for this autonomous region will remain
static for 50 years. See id. These policies include "the vesting of executive, legislative,
and independent judicial power in the Hong Kong SAR and retaining laws currently in
force in Hong Kong 'basically unchanged, [ .. .I including the current social and eco-
nomic systems and life-style.'" Id. Hong Kong is also exempt from central government
taxation, and has control over its customs and financial status. See id. The executive
and legislative bodies are composed of local inhabitants selected in local elections. See
id. at 138-39. The judiciary is independent of the central Chinese government. See id. at
139.
193. Buyda, supra note 182, at 2. Granting Chechnya a special status with unique
legal rights is not as outlandish as it may seem, given the structure of Russian federal-
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Article 3.3 states that "Referendums [sic] and free elections shall be the
highest expression of the people's authority."'198 Articles 135 and 136 on
amendments to the Constitution may also serve as a basis for a
referendum. 19 9
The main problem with a referendum is that it will only end the
Chechen-Russian conflict if the people vote for Chechen independence.
The Chechens believe themselves to be independent already, so they would
not honor a vote the other way, and this could reignite the war. Those in
support of a referendum, however, anticipate a vote in favor of Chechen
independence. This is based upon the anti-war, and more generally, the
anti-Chechen sentiment of the masses.
20 0
As an economic and social matter, many Russians would gladly sup-
port recognition of Chechen independence. The Chechens are generally
thought by Russians to be barbaric and are portrayed as such by the media
and the Russian government. 2 01 Journalists in Chechnya are routinely kid-
napped and held for ransom. Despite the Republic's utter destruction, it is
still a "universally armed republic, [where] an automatic weapon is for
many their sole 'tool' for work."'20 2 Beyond that, rebuilding the country
and its infrastructure will cost billions: about $700 million (U.S.) had
already been set aside in the Russian budget by early 1997 to rebuild the
region.20 3
The referendum option, while constitutionally feasible, runs too great
a risk of fueling further hostilities. Moreover, Russian aid to the region will
likely cease if Chechnya gains full independence. The Chechens could not
force Russia to pay reparations for war damage, and they would never be
able to raise ample revenue to rebuild due to the scale of the destruction
and the existing atmosphere of clan-rule and chaos.
20 4
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199. Such an amendment would likely fall under Chapter 3 of the Constitution,
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8, Article 136.
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drug dealers, prostitutes, arm merchants and smugglers." Klein, supra note 10, at 8.
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C. The Chechen Position: Chechnya Did Not Secede from the Russian
Federation
A third possibility lies in the Chechen argument that the existence of
Chechnya does not violate the Russian Constitution or Russia's territorial
integrity because Chechnya was never part of Russia, and thus, did not and
could not secede.20 5 The Chechens argue that even though the Chechen
Republic was included as a subject of the Federation in Article 65 of the
Constitution, they had already declared their independence before the Con-
stitution was drafted.20 6 Furthermore, the Chechens argue that they took
no part in the creation of the Federation, did not sign the Federation
Treaty, and did not take part in the drafting of or voting for the Russian
Constitution.20 7 This would seem to run counter to the right to self-deter-
mination expounded in the preamble and Article 5.3 of the Russian Consti-
tution, as well as in the Soviet Constitution in effect before 1992.208
International law generally does not recognize the right of secession as
part of the right of national self-determination. 20 9 The 1975 Helsinki Act
provides that nations can exercise their right to self-determination only
within existing state boundaries.2 10 The Chechens would counter that
they never seceded. However, the fact that the international community
recognized the Russian Federation in accordance with the Soviet bounda-
ries means that Chechnya was understood by the world to be a part of the
new Russian Federation.2 1 1 Thus, the Chechens' declaration of indepen-
dence is not a mere refusal to accede to the new State.
The question remains whether Chechnya has constituted itself as an
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NEws, Sept. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, MOSNWS File.
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209. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2649, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1915th mtg. at XXXV, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/2649 (1970), known as the "Friendly Relations Declaration," was intended to
encourage a "speedy end" to colonialism. A more general interpretation of the docu-
ment to support secessionist claims outside of the colonialist context is explicitly
negated in the instrument itself, which states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination for peoples as described above and thus possessed of a govern-
ment representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinc-
tion as to race, creed or colour.
Id.
210. See Helsinki Final Act, Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe,
Aug. 1, 1975.
211. See Walker, supra note 129, at 56.
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independent state since its secession. 212 The Montevideo Convention of
1933 defines a state as "a person of international law ... [possessing] (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d)
capacity to enter into relations with other states."213 Chechnya fulfills the
first three criteria; however, it does not have the capacity to enter into inter-
national relations due to Russia's threat to sever diplomatic ties with any
state who recognizes Chechnya as independent.214 As a result, no state or
international organization has done so. 2 1 5 Therefore, the Chechen posi-
tion is not a practicable third option so long as Russia refuses to recognize
its independence.
D. A Pragmatic Compromise: "Special Status" for Chechnya
The foregoing analysis establishes the "special status" option as the most
realistic solution to the Chechen crisis. While it is true that the Russian
leadership has been promoting this direction from the outset, a key ele-
ment, or concession, that they have failed to make explicit in their "Tartar-
stan model" offer is the recognition of Islam in Chechnya. It is uncertain
whether the current Chechen leadership, under severe pressure from mili-
tant Islamic factions, will accept such an offer, but the Republic's dire situ-
ation detracts from its strength as a bargaining partner. Moreover, a
special status for Chechnya will effectively give the Republic the social
autonomy it seeks, in addition to the added benefit of greater economic
security and assistance provided by Russia.
In any event, a return to war appears unlikely. Russia's humiliating
defeat not only exhibited the Russian military's ineffectiveness but also
brought the armed forces to "the brink of disintegration."216 As Yeltsin's
former National Security Advisor Ivan Rybkin explained, "[s]ome people in
power want to settle the problems of Chechnya by the old Bolshevik princi-
ple ... [h]it first and think afterward. We have already tried that way. It
didn't work."2 17
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Conclusion
There is no simple solution to the Russian-Chechen impasse. The Chechen
Republic has been de facto independent for a number of years, a fact that
Russian officials have acknowledged. 2 18  Russia, however, treats
Chechnya's actions with a kind of "legal dualism," whereby everything is
treated as if it is a matter of course. 2 19 That these actions contradict the
Russian Constitution and federal laws is a fact that Russia has gotten used
to.2 20 Perhaps this status could be sustained indefinitely, but such a state
makes a mockery of the Constitution, an instrument that is supposed mold
the new Russia into a law-based society.
The best course would be to legitimate Russo-Chechen relations
within the framework of the Constitution. Of the proposed resolutions, the
most potential exists in granting Chechnya a "special status" within the
Russian Federation. This change in status, envisioned by the Constitution
itself, would keep Chechnya in the Federation while allowing sufficient
autonomy for the Republic to embrace its Islamic tradition through their
legal system. In effect, this approach would retain the status quo but elimi-
nate the tensions surrounding the inter-governmental relations and the
potential for further warring. While this solution will not solve the Repub-
lic's dire social conditions, normalizing its relationship with Russia will
permit Chechnya the economic and cultural latitude to start down that
path.
218. Anatoly Shabad, Year of Living Peacefully, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at 2,
available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, MOSTMS File. See also Roy, supra note 200, at 3;
Solodova, supra note 193, at 1; Siren, supra note 83, at 87.
219. Shabad, supra note 218.
220. See id. at 2.
Vol. 32
